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Abstract
Many existing U.S. counter-terrorism policies, including those governing
targeting and detention, rely on an empirical assumption that terrorist groups are
primarily military organizations. This assumption may be appropriate in the case of
al-Qaeda, but it fails to describe terrorist groups that engage not only in warfare but
also in governance and state-building such as the Islamic State, a self-declared
“caliphate” that—at the height of its expansion in 2014—claimed sovereignty over
an estimated 34,000 square miles and 10 million civilians. This Article identifies a
category of “state-building” terrorist groups that can be distinguished by the
following characteristics: (1) the presence of a non-military wing analogous to a
civilian bureaucracy that provides services, including food, electricity, and
healthcare to the governed population; (2) dual-use institutions that simultaneously
perform military and civilian functions; and (3) a degree of coercive control over
civilians that creates observational equivalence between victims and supporters of
the group. As a result of these characteristics, existing U.S. targeting doctrines that
were designed with primarily military groups such as al-Qaeda in mind, tend to
penalize civilians when applied to state-building terrorist groups that govern people
and territory. This argument is supported by archival Islamic State documents,
social media data generated by users in or near Islamic State-controlled areas of
Syria and Iraq, interviews with former Islamic State combatants and civilian
employees, and original data on the targeting of 11 different zakāt offices on 19
different occasions. These zakāt offices, which are located in densely populated
urban areas, simultaneously collect taxes (a war-sustaining activity) and distribute
cash assistance and food to civilians (a humanitarian activity), and illustrate the
costs of targeting dual-use institutions that perform both military and civilian
functions. The Article concludes with targeting recommendations that take into
consideration the structural vulnerability of civilians living in areas controlled and
governed by terrorist groups while still allowing governments to prosecute civilians
who aid such groups under domestic material support laws.
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Introduction

Many existing U.S. counter-terrorism policies, including those governing
targeting and detention, rely on an empirical assumption that terrorist groups are
primarily military organizations. According to this logic, which is central to a postSeptember 11th counter-terrorism paradigm that was heavily influenced by and
remains oriented around the threat posed by al-Qaeda, all members of terrorist
groups are presumptively combatants, and all of their activities are military or warsustaining in nature. This assumption may be appropriate for the case of al-Qaeda,
but it fails to describe terrorist groups that engage not only in warfare but also in
governance and state-building. An important contemporary case of the latter is the
Islamic State, a self-declared “caliphate” that—at the height of its expansion in
2014—claimed sovereignty over an estimated 35,000 square miles and ten million
civilians,1 whom it refers to as to as al-nās (“the people”)2 or al-riʿāya (literally,
“the flock”).3
This Article identifies a category of terrorist groups that engage in “statebuilding,” defined as the creation of administrative and coercive institutions
designed to govern people and resources within a defined territory.4 Examples of
state-building terrorist groups include the Islamic State, the Taliban, the Irish
Republican Army (IRA), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), among others. Given the absence of a definitional consensus on the
meaning of “terrorism” in international law,5 this Article defines “terrorist groups”
as entities that are legally designated as such by states, focusing on a particular
subset of terrorist groups that are engaged in armed conflict with the United States
and therefore implicate international humanitarian law (IHL) and customary
international law. Among the various armed groups that engage in terrorism, statebuilding terrorist groups can be distinguished from others by the following
characteristics: (1) the presence of a non-military wing analogous to a civilian
bureaucracy that provides services, including food, electricity, and healthcare, to
the governed population; (2) dual-use institutions that simultaneously perform
1

Jean-Charles Brisard & Damien Martinez, Islamic State: The Economy-Based Terrorist Funding,
REUTERS (Oct. 2014), http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Islamic-State.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WFT-MC8F]; The Growing Strategic Threat of ISIS: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong. 12 (2015) (statement of Rick Brennan, Jr., Ph.D., Senior
Political
Scientist,
RAND
Corp.),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG114hhrg93284/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg93284.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7HN-2JUR].
2
See Islamic State, ( اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ ﺗﻮزع اﻟﺒﻨﺰﯾﻦ ﻣﺠﺎﻧﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﺎسThe Islamic State Distributes Free Benzene
to the People) (May 8, 2014), https://justpaste.it/g49u [https://perma.cc/B6M8-9VP2].
3
See Islamic State,  اﻟﻄﺒﻌﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﯿﺔ:( وﺛﯿﻘﺔ اﻟﻤﺪﯾﻨﺔCharter of the City: Second Edition) (2016),
https://archive.org/details/wth_mm.
4
I adapt this definition from that of Sean Yom. See SEAN YOM, FROM RESILIENCE TO REVOLUTION:
HOW FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS DESTABILIZE THE MIDDLE EAST 3 (2016).
5
DUSTIN A. LEWIS, NAZ K. MODIRZADEH & GABRIELLA BLUM, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM ON INT’L
L. AND ARMED CONFLICT, MEDICAL CARE IN ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW
AND
STATE
RESPONSES
TO
TERRORISM
22
(2015),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/22508590/HLS_PILAC_Medical_Care_in_Armed_Co
nflict_IHL_and_State_Responses_to_Terrorism_September_2015.pdf?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/Z5U2-7YNV].
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military and civilian functions; and (3) a degree of coercive control over civilians
that creates observational equivalence6 between victims and supporters of the
group. As a result of these characteristics, targeting doctrines that were designed
with primarily military groups such as al-Qaeda in mind tend to penalize civilians
when applied to state-building terrorist groups that govern people and territory.
The increasing rate of civilian casualties over the course of the U.S.-led
campaign against the Islamic State, which reached an all-time high of 1,200 in the
month of March 2017,7 calls for scrutiny of current targeting policies, particularly
in light of concerns that President Donald Trump’s Administration was seeking to
“dismantle or bypass” restrictions on targeting.8 In addition to the possibility that
current targeting policies are violating IHL,9 anecdotal evidence suggests that these
policies are counter-productively impacting Iraqi and Syrian public opinion toward
the United States in ways that may ultimately increase support for the Islamic State
and other insurgent groups. As Belkis Wille, the Iraq researcher for Human Rights
Watch, described the mood in refugee camps near Mosul, “Remarkably, when I
interview families at camps who have just fled the fighting, the first thing they
complain about is not the three horrific years they spent under ISIS, or the last
months of no food or clean water, but the American airstrikes.”10 The evidence
presented in this Article, which was collected over the course of five months of
fieldwork in southern Turkey and Iraq, includes primary source documents
produced by the Islamic State, social media data generated by internet users in or
near Islamic State-controlled areas of Syria and Iraq, interviews with former
Islamic State combatants and civilian employees, and original data on the targeting
of 11 Islamic State zakāt offices on 19 different occasions.11 These zakāt offices,
6

In the natural and social sciences, “observational equivalence” refers to a situation in which two or
more entities are indistinguishable on the basis of their observable characteristics when in fact they
may be different for unobserved reasons. See, e.g., GARY KING, ROBERT KEOHANE & SIDNEY
VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 59–60
(1994).
7
See Jared Malsin, Civilian Casualties from American Airstrikes in the War Against ISIS Are At An
All-Time High, TIME (Mar. 26, 2017), http://time.com/4713476/isis-syria-iraq-casualties-usairstikes/ [https://perma.cc/4JDG-D289].
8
Oona Hathaway, Why the Spike in Civilian Casualties of U.S. Military Action?, NEWSWEEK (Mar.
28, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/why-spike-civilian-casualties-us-military-action-575266
[https://perma.cc/SR8Q-KFUL].
9
Iraq: Civilians Killed by Airstrikes in Their Homes after They Were Told Not to Flee Mosul,
AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/iraq-civilianskilled-by-airstrikes-in-their-homes-after-they-were-told-not-to-flee-mosul/ [https://perma.cc/J8LN33XY].
10
Samuel Oakford, Trump’s Air War Has Already Killed More Than 2,000 Civilians, DAILY BEAST
(Jul. 17, 2017), http://www.thedailybeast.com/president-trumps-air-war-kills-12-civilians-per-day
[https://perma.cc/X8KW-Z2GL].
11
Zakāt, the third of five Pillars of Islam, refers to a mandatory charitable contribution traditionally
levied at a rate of 2.5 percent of a Muslim’s income and assets that is functionally similar to an
income tax. Natana DeLong-Bas, The Five Pillars of Islam, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES IN ISLAMIC
STUD.
(Dec.
14,
2009),
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0062.xml [https://perma.cc/VH9V-XYDL]. Zakāt is
considered to be a universal obligation on all Muslims with sufficient means. Id. The Islamic State
has established zakāt offices throughout its territory in Iraq and Syria that are responsible both for
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which are located in densely populated areas and simultaneously collect taxes (a
war-sustaining activity) and distribute cash assistance and food to impoverished
civilians (a humanitarian activity), illustrate the potential costs of targeting dualuse institutions that simultaneously perform military and civilian functions.
Part II presents a brief history of the current U.S. counter-terrorism
paradigm since its origins in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks to argue
that this paradigm has failed to adapt to important changes in the landscape of
global terrorism since 2001, including the rise of “state-building” terrorist groups.
Part III generates typologies to illustrate how state-building terrorist groups differ
from two other types of terrorist groups—(1) non-territorial and (2) territorial but
non-governing—in ways that have important implications for the targeting of
personnel and objects. Parts IV and V present primary-source evidence in support
of the argument that existing targeting policies designed for al-Qaeda and other
primarily military terrorist groups tend to penalize civilians when applied to statebuilding terrorist groups such as the Islamic State. Part VI offers targeting
recommendations that take into consideration the structural vulnerability of
civilians living in areas controlled and governed by state-building terrorist groups
while still allowing governments to prosecute civilians who aid such groups under
domestic material support laws. The Appendix describes the methodology and
sources of data upon which the Article is based.
II.

A Brief History of the Current U.S. Counter-Terrorism Paradigm and Its
Divergence from Realities on the Ground
A.

Origins of the Current U.S. Counter-Terrorism Paradigm

Shortly after the September 11th attacks, former President George W. Bush
declared the beginning of the “war on terror” in a speech before Congress.12
Although al-Qaeda did not formally claim responsibility for the attacks until April
2002,13 the group was identified as a “prime suspect” by September 17,14 and was
assumed to be the perpetrator by the time of the President’s statement on September
20: “Our war on terror begins with [al-Qaeda], but it does not end there. It will not
collecting zakāt in the form of cash or food and redistributing these resources to the poor. See Mara
Revkin, What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? New Data from the Islamic State in
Syria (Oct. 22, 2017) (presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association on Sept. 3, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023317
[https://perma.cc/S9SY-4MMR].
12
Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2001),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html [https://perma.cc/AJU5-MSG2]
[hereinafter Bush Address] (text of President George W. Bush’s address to a joint session of
Congress).
13
Al Qaeda Claims Responsibility for September 11, CNN (Apr. 15, 2002),
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/04/15/alzawahiri.transcript/
[https://perma.cc/3WDD-P8FE].
14
Todd Purdum, After the Attacks: The White House; Bush Warns of a Wrathful, Shadowy and
Inventive War, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2001), https://nyti.ms/2F6gAai.
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end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and
defeated.”15 Although the President framed the “war on terror” as broader than mere
retaliation against al-Qaeda, in reality, the speech inaugurated a new counterterrorism paradigm designed almost exclusively around the group that—in this
historical moment—was perceived as the greatest threat to U.S. national security
and global stability. The domestic legal basis for the “war on terror” was established
with the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorized
the President to:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States . . . .16
Although al-Qaeda is not named in the text of the 2001 AUMF, over time, President
Bush’s Administration and later that of President Barack Obama interpreted the
language to apply not only to al-Qaeda but also to its “associated forces” for both
detention and targeting purposes. In May 2013, President Obama clarified that the
Administration was continuing to rely on the 2001 AUMF to take “lethal, targeted
action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted
aircraft commonly referred to as drones.”17 The Obama Administration articulated
a two-part test for determining whether or not a given group was an “associated
force” of al-Qaeda and therefore covered by the 2001 AUMF: the group must be
“(1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and
(2) . . . a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners.”18 The term “associated forces” has been interpreted expansively
to include the Islamic State (operating in Syria, Iraq, and Libya) and more recently
al-Shabaab in Somalia, although neither of these groups was in existence at the time
the 2001 AUMF was signed into law.19 In 2013, President Obama acknowledged
that the twelve-year-old AUMF was outdated and pledged to work with Congress
“to refine, and ultimately repeal” it.20 Nonetheless, the 2001 AUMF remains in
effect under the Administration of President Donald Trump, despite growing

15

Bush Address, supra note 12.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
17
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013),
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-presidentnational-defense-university [https://perma.cc/826W-XKNT]).
18
Jeh Johson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Speech at the Oxford Union, Univ. of Oxford: The
Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End? (Nov. 30, 2012) (transcript available
at
https://www.lawfareblog.com/jeh-johnson-speech-oxford-union
[https://perma.cc/H9796VD9]).
19
Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Obama Expands War with Al Qaeda to Include
Shabab in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2k9Mw3a.
20
Obama, supra note 17.
16
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pressure for its repeal and numerous proposals for its replacement with a new,
Islamic State-specific AUMF.21
It might be argued that the Taliban, another state-building terrorist group
that—like the Islamic State—governs territory and people, was as influential as alQaeda in the formation of U.S. counter-terrorism policies in the 2000s. Although
the Taliban is mentioned in the Bush Administration’s 2002 and 2006 National
Security Strategy and in the Obama Administration’s 2010 National Security
Strategy, these documents contain a total of forty references to al-Qaeda in
comparison with only six references to the Taliban, indicating that both
administrations were much more focused on the threat posed by al-Qaeda.22
Although the U.S. counter-terrorism paradigm and its justificatory legal
framework have remained virtually unchanged since 2001, the global landscape of
terrorism has been fundamentally transformed by three overarching trends: (1) the
weakening of al-Qaeda’s “core” and decentralization of its operations through a
network of affiliates; (2) the frequent reconfiguration of alliances and rivalries
between different terrorist groups over time; and (3) in the aftermath of the Arab
Spring, the rise of a new wave of jihadist groups that saw the overthrow of
authoritarian regimes as an opportunity to seize territory and initiate alternative
state-building projects based on shariʿa. This third development is the primary
focus of this Article but it represents just one facet of a broader problem: the
21

On June 29, 2017, the House Appropriations Committee approved for the first time an amendment
proposed by Democratic Representative Barbara Lee that would repeal the 2001 AUMF. Although
unlikely to become law, “it will at least force some debate.” See Robert Chesney, Repealing the
2001 AUMF? A Surprise Vote by the House Appropriations Committee, LAWFARE (Jun. 29, 2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/repealing-2001-aumf-surprise-vote-house-appropriations-committee
[https://perma.cc/H87D-JW8U]. See also Harold Koh, The Lawful Way to Fight the Islamic State,
POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/the-lawful-way-tofight-the-islamic-state-110444 [https://perma.cc/S5WA-PP22] (arguing that the Administration
“should engage with Congress to develop an ISIL-specific AUMF”). Several members of Congress
have released proposals for a new Islamic State-specific AUMF in recent years, including H.R.J.
Res. __, 115th Cong. (2017) (draft by Representative Eliot Engel (D-NY)); S.J. Res. 43, 115th Cong.
(2017) (sponsored by Senators Tim Kaine (D-VA) and Jeff Flake (R-AZ)); H.R.J. Res. 100, 115th
Cong. (2017) (sponsored by Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA) and others); S.J. Res. 31, 115th
Cong. (2017) and H.J. Res. 89, 115th Cong. (2017) (sponsored, respectively, by Senator Todd
Young (R-IN) and Representative Jim Banks (R-IN)); H.R. Con. Res. 2, 115th Cong. (2017)
(sponsored by Representative Tom Cole (R-OK) and Representative Scott Taylor (R-VA)); and S.J.
Res. 29, 114th Cong. (2016) (sponsored by Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY)). See, e.g., ISIS
AUMF Proposals in 115th Congress (2017-18), JUST SEC. (Jun. 19, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Just-Security-AUMF-Chart-June-192017fin.pdf [https://perma.cc/54R9-CC92]; Summary of ISIS AUMF Proposals, HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST (June 2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/ISIS-AUMF-ProposalChart.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2BW-E7BH].
22
See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(Sept. 2002), http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MBN-FM68]; THE WHITE
HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Mar. 2006),
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNC6-ZFB2]; THE WHITE HOUSE,
NATIONAL
SECURITY
STRATEGY
(May
2010),
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L4AY-BSNK].
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disconnect between an outdated counter-terrorism paradigm and the new realities
of global terrorism.
B.

The Decentralization of al-Qaeda

Since 2001, al-Qaeda has undergone a fundamental transformation from a
highly centralized organization with a top-down command structure to a diffuse
network of semi-autonomous affiliates with “no clear center of gravity,” according
to anonymous senior U.S. government officials.23 By 2005, much of al-Qaeda’s
mid-level leadership had been killed or detained and thousands of lower-ranking
operatives had been killed in U.S. counter-terror operations, particularly in
Afghanistan.24 By 2007, experts were concluding that “Al-Qaeda central no longer
exists”25 and that the organization was “only a shell of its former self.”26 Years
before al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin Laden, was killed in 2011 by U.S. Navy Seals
in Pakistan, analysts had already begun to describe the group as a “leaderless
jihad.”27
Over time, the group has adopted an increasingly decentralized strategy
based largely on encouraging and inspiring local “affiliates” to attack Western
targets.28 Although al-Qaeda’s own fighting force has been decimated since 2001,
its network of affiliates has grown to include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP, based in Yemen), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, based in
Algeria), al-Shabaab (based in Somalia), and al-Qaeda in Iraq (which has since
evolved into the Islamic State).29 Accordingly, the most damaging al-Qaeda attacks
in recent years have been planned and carried out not by the dwindling “core”
leadership responsible for September 11th but by local affiliates or individual “lone
wolves”30 inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology. Although they claim to be acting in the
name of al-Qaeda, there is often little to no evidence of a chain-of-command,
planning, or coordination by al-Qaeda leadership. Such attacks include the bombing

23

JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RES. SERV., R41070, AL QAEDA AND AFFILIATES: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, GLOBAL PRESENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, at ii (2011),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXW3-WMVD].
24
Anthony N. Celso, Al Qaeda’s Post–9/11 Organizational Structure and Strategy: The Role of
Islamist Regional Affiliates, 23 MEDITERRANEAN Q. 30, 33 (2012).
25
Eben Kaplan, The Rise of al-Qaedaism, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Jul. 18, 2007),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rise-al-qaedaism [https://perma.cc/5WDZ-QAZ8] (quoting an
interview with Fawaz Gergez).
26
Fred Burton & Scott Stewart, Al Qaeda and the Strategic Threat to the U.S. Homeland, STRATFOR
(Jul.
25,
2007),
https://www.stratfor.com/al_qaeda_and_strategic_threat_u_s_homeland
[https://perma.cc/7D3W-KK5T].
27
How
Jihad
Went
Freelance,
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
31,
2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/10601243 [https://perma.cc/4Y7J-6H2L].
28
Celso, supra note 24, at 33.
29
R. K. Cragin, A Recent History of al-Qa’ida, 57 HIST. J. 803, 807 (2014).
30
Sam Frizell, Al-Qaeda Leader Calls for Lone-Wolf Attacks on American Homes, TIME (Sept. 14,
2015), http://time.com/4033210/al-qaeda-leader-calls-for-lone-wolf-attacks-on-american-homes/
[https://perma.cc/VL7H-GJRH].
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of two Bali nightclubs in October 2002 (perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah),31 the
detonation of four truck bombs in Istanbul in 2003 (perpetrated by Turkish
extremists who approached al-Qaeda for financing after they had already planned
the operation independently),32 and the London suicide bombings of July 2005
(perpetrated by four British nationals who had visited Pakistan before the attack but
had no direct ties to al-Qaeda).33 The decentralization and geographical dispersion
of al-Qaeda since 2011 has made the group less unified but also less predictable as
affiliates and “lone wolves” devise their own operations without organizational
oversight.
C.

Shifting Alliances and Rivalries

A second important development has been the reconfiguration of alliances
and rivalries between different terrorist groups over time. Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, its former host in Afghanistan, have drifted apart since 2001. By 2010,
analysts and U.S. government officials were observing a “growing rift” and
“fissures” between the groups, evidenced by the Taliban’s refusal to provide shelter
and assistance to al-Qaeda fighters in the Pakistani border areas,34 and public
accusations by al-Qaeda ideologues that the Taliban’s strategy was too “nationalist”
(in contrast with al-Qaeda’s transnational ambitions).35 Even one of Osama Bin
Laden’s own sons admitted, “[a]lthough Al-Qaeda and the Taliban organizations
band together when necessary, they do not love one another.”36
Meanwhile, another important alliance has formed and broken in the years
since 2001. The group now known as the Islamic State, which emerged from alQaeda in Iraq in the early 2000s (called the “Islamic State in Iraq” (ISI) at that
time),37 pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, who succeeded Osama Bin
31

The 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing Plot, BBC (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-19881138 [http://perma.cc/773L-86TA].
32
Karl Vick, Al-Qaeda’s Hand in Istanbul Plot, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021201715.html
[https://perma.cc/S79F-R32K].
33
Mark Townsend, Leak reveals official story of London bombings, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2006),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/apr/09/july7.uksecurity [https://perma.cc/8DHS-5KPC].
34
Myra MacDonald, Fresh Reports Surface of Taliban-al Qaeda Rift, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2010),
http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2010/03/14/fresh-reports-surface-of-taliban-al-qaeda-rift/
[https://perma.cc/QKU6-8XQR].
35
Vahid Brown, Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban: “Diametrically Opposed”?, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Oct.
22,
2009),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/22/al-qaeda-and-the-afghan-talibandiametrically-opposed/ [https://perma.cc/TX29-RMSX]. See also Juha Saarinen, What is the current
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Laden to become al-Qaeda’s leader in 2011.38 As the Syrian civil war intensified,
ISI’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, took advantage of the nearby power vacuum
to project the group’s influence into Syria, where the group rapidly captured
territory and helped to establish al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra in
2013.39 When al-Baghdadi changed his group’s name to the “Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant” (ISIL) to reflect its geographical expansion and tried to absorb
Jabhat al-Nusra by unilaterally declaring a “merger,” al-Zawahiri objected to this
power grab in a letter that rejected the merger and reminded al-Baghdadi that his
“seat” was in Iraq.40 After failed attempts at mediation, al-Qaeda formally
dissociated itself from ISIS in February 2014, declaring that “ISIS ‘is not a branch
of the al-Qaeda group . . . does not have an organizational relationship with it and
[al-Qaeda] is not the group responsible for their actions.’”41 A few months later, on
June 29, 2014, al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of a “caliphate” and again
changed the group’s name—this time to the “Islamic State,” signaling global
ambitions beyond Iraq and Syria.42 The decision to declare a caliphate was widely
criticized by al-Qaeda officials and affiliates as premature and lacking
“consultation” with other jihadist groups and scholars.43 In November 2015, after
the Islamic State’s spokesman gave a speech deriding skeptics of the group for
being “tricked by the fatwas of the donkeys and mules of knowledge,”44 AQIM and
38
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AQAP issued a joint video statement accusing the Islamic State of “deviation and
misguidance.”45 Although the feud between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State has
been bitter, it is not necessarily permanent. In April 2017, Iraqi Vice President Ayad
Allawi reported hearing of “discussions and dialogue” between the two groups
about the possibility of restoring their former alliance.46
Since 2001, alliances and rivalries between different terrorist groups have
undergone frequent and dramatic reconfigurations. The changing relationships
described above call into question the continued relevance of a counter-terror
framework that remains oriented around “al-Qaeda and associated forces” and does
not acknowledge the instability and impermanence of inter-group relationships
over time.
D.

The Rise of State-Building Terrorist Groups

A third transformative development, and one that is the primary focus of
this Article, is the rise of “state-building” terrorist groups that aspire to govern
people and territory. Although the current counter-terrorism paradigm is designed
around the assumption that terrorist groups are primarily military organizations,
that assumption is contradicted by the empirical realities of a new generation of
terrorist groups with state-like ambitions for sovereignty. Since the Arab Spring
began in 2011, authoritarian governments in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen
have been overthrown by revolutionary movements (although Egypt’s 2013
military coup has led to the resurgence of authoritarianism in that country).47 In
Syria, the embattled government of Bashar al-Assad has managed to retain power
at the cost of a deadly civil war that has become increasingly internationalized over
time. In all of these countries, political instability has created opportunities for nonstate actors—both domestic and foreign—to challenge state monopolies on power.
In war-torn Syria and neighboring Iraq, where a nascent democracy has periodically
faced protests condemning public-sector corruption, ineffective service provision,
and preferential treatment of the Shiʿite majority (which controls the government),
the Islamic State has exploited these grievances to recruit supporters and seize
territory. In Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, Salafi groups took advantage of local
frustration with the corruption and inefficiency of government courts to establish
their own independent judiciaries in the immediate aftermath of the 2011
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revolution, creating a situation of competitive legal pluralism.48 Since then, a Sinaibased insurgent group, Anṣār Bayt al-Maqdis, has pledged allegiance to the Islamic
State and claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks targeting Egyptian
government personnel.49 Although the group does not yet control territory, it is
reportedly attempting to impose its version of shariʿa in the city of Rafah by
ordering women to cover their faces and stay at home except when accompanied
by a male guardian,50 and by confiscating cigarettes and other contraband items.51
These examples reflect a new wave of “state-building” jihadist groups that
has emerged in recent years, signaling “an end of al Qaeda’s unipolar global jihad
of the past decade and a return to a multipolar jihadosphere.”52 This new generation
includes the Islamic State and affiliated groups outside of Iraq and Syria that have
pledged allegiance to it, such as Anṣār Bayt al-Maqdis.53 It also includes “Ansar alSharia” groups in five different countries that share the same name and a common
goal of establishing shariʿa-based governance but nonetheless operate
independently of one another. 54 State-building terrorist groups differ from groups
that do not hold territory or engage in governance in that they rely heavily on
civilian employees and on the support and cooperation of the local population. This
Article argues that existing counter-terror frameworks designed with al-Qaeda in
mind tend to penalize civilians when applied to state-building terrorist groups such
as the Islamic State.
E.

The U.S. Counter-Terrorism Paradigm Has Failed to Adapt to New
Realities

Although the global landscape of terrorism has evolved significantly since
2001, the U.S. counter-terrorism paradigm has not kept pace with these changes. In
June 2011, President Obama’s official counter-terrorism strategy acknowledged
that, “[f]or the past decade, the preponderance of the United States’ [counterterrorism] effort has been aimed at preventing the recurrence of an attack on the
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Homeland directed by [al-Qaeda].”55 Although the strategy referred to the
importance of adapting to the “next wave” of transnational terrorism,56 the legal
framework underlying U.S. counter-terror policies has changed little in the years
since. Each of the three developments discussed above presents a challenge to the
continued viability of laws and policies that were designed around a version of alQaeda that no longer exists, and that fail to account for new forms of terrorism.
First, today’s al-Qaeda is far more decentralized and geographically
dispersed than the organization that attacked the United States on September 11,57
yet the domestic legal basis for counter-terror targeting remains unchanged. The
Obama Administration has cited the 2001 AUMF as justification for targeting alQaeda affiliates that did not exist at the time of the September 11th attacks, notably
al-Shabaab. 58 In November 2016, the Administration expanded the scope of the
2001 AUMF to cover al-Shabaab in Somalia by deeming the group to be part of the
armed conflict against al-Qaeda,59 even though al-Shabaab was not formed until
2006,60 and did not pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda until 2012.61 Although alShabaab has embraced the rhetoric of global jihad for branding and recruitment
purposes,62 its actions indicate that its true agenda remains primarily local
(demanding the implementation of shariʿa and expulsion of foreign peacekeepers
from its territory, where ninety-five percent of its violent operations have been
conducted).63 There is little evidence to suggest that al-Shabaab has ever been
genuinely committed to expanding its operations beyond the Horn of Africa, and it
has been suggested that the group’s primary motivation for entering into an alliance
with al-Qaeda was not to support its attacks on the U.S. and other Western targets,
but rather, to extract resources from al-Qaeda—in the form of funding, training,
weapons, and “military know-how”—to more effectively pursue its own agenda on
Somali soil.64 “Stretching” the scope of the 2001 AUMF to cover groups such as
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al-Shabaab that postdate the September 11th attacks by many years threatens to
undermine the legality and legitimacy of U.S. counter-terror operations.65
Second, and related to the first concern, the frequent reconfiguration of
alliances between terrorist groups, some of which did not even exist in 2001, poses
a challenge to a counter-terrorism framework oriented around al-Qaeda and its
“associated forces.” The problem is illustrated by the case of the Islamic State,
which originated as an offshoot and ally of al-Qaeda but has since cut ties with the
group over ideological and strategic disagreements. In September 2014, the Obama
Administration said that both the 2001 AUMF and subsequent Authorization for
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 provided sufficient legal
authority for airstrikes targeting the Islamic State.66 But given the official split
between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the latter no longer satisfies the definition
of “associated forces” articulated by the Obama Administration.67
Third, the rise of a new generation of “state-building” terrorist groups
presents challenges for a counter-terrorism framework that was designed for
primarily military groups such as al-Qaeda that do not control territory or govern
people. The remainder of this Article will explain why the empirical characteristics
of state-building terrorist groups—(1) the presence of a non-military wing
analogous to a civilian bureaucracy that provides services, including food,
electricity, and healthcare, to the governed population; (2) dual-use institutions that
simultaneously perform military and civilian functions; and (3) a degree of coercive
control over civilians that creates observational equivalence between victims and
supporters of the group—necessitate a rethinking of existing targeting principles.
III.

Structural Characteristics of State-Building Terrorist Groups

A.

A Typology of Terrorist Groups

Scholars of civil war and state formation have long recognized an empirical
distinction between armed groups that engage exclusively in warfare and terrorism
and those with state-like aspirations to govern people and territory.68 Although the
latter are not a new phenomenon—early twentieth century examples include the
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Irish Republican Army (IRA)69 and the Chinese Communist Party70—the study of
this category of groups is a relatively new area of inquiry and has inspired a growing
political science literature on “rebel governance,” which explores the ways in which
armed groups use institutions to regulate their relations with civilians.71 Armed
groups that engage in governance and state-building, including terrorist groups,
tend to establish institutions that provide services to civilians (e.g., education,
healthcare, and electricity) and extract resources from them (e.g., taxation, forced
labor, and military conscription). Building on the insights and findings of the rebel
governance literature, this Article identifies a category of “state-building” terrorist
groups with structural characteristics that have important implications for targeting
decisions.
The following typology differentiates between three different types of
terrorist groups: (1) non-territorial, (2) territorial but non-governing, and (3) statebuilding (Table 1). Non-territorial terrorist groups are those that do not control
territory and therefore do not have the ability to govern a civilian population.
Examples include al-Qaeda and domestic extremist groups such as the
contemporary Ku Klux Klan. The second category refers to terrorist groups that
control territory but do not engage in governance of civilians, such as Boko Haram
in Nigeria and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda. Such groups rely
primarily on violence and coercion to obtain cooperation from civilians.72 The third
category refers to groups that both control territory and govern civilians. Examples
include the Taliban, the Islamic State, and the FARC in Colombia. Unlike the
second category, these state-building terrorist groups generally seek to legitimize
their authority to the population by creating institutions that provide public goods
and security.
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Table 1. A Typology of Terrorist Groups
Territorial Control
1. Non-Territorial
2. Territorial but NonGoverning
3. State-Building

B.

Governance of
Civilians

Examples
al-Qaeda, KKK

X
X

Boko Haram, LRA
X

Islamic State, Taliban,
FARC

Three Characteristics of State-Building Terrorist Groups

State-building terrorist groups can be further distinguished by three
characteristics. First, these groups can be differentiated into military and nonmilitary wings. The non-military wing consists of institutions that maintain order
and provide services to the civilian population. For example, the Islamic State
employs thousands of personnel in hospitals, schools, municipal offices, and police
departments that engage in ordinary law enforcement and crime control activities.
These personnel generally do not carry weapons (except for police) and do not
necessarily swear oaths of allegiance to the Islamic State. As such, they are
analogous to civil servants, bureaucrats, or contractors, rather than combatants. In
some cases, they are not even paid by the Islamic State.73 Many of the Islamic
State’s civilian employees continued to receive salaries and pensions from the Iraqi
and Syrian governments for up to a year in areas captured by the group.74
Second, state-building terrorist groups tend to operate dual-use institutions
that simultaneously perform military and civilian functions. All three categories of
terrorist groups utilize assets that an opposing military would classify as “military
objectives,” defined as objects such as munitions factories and military vehicles
that “by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action” and are therefore lawful targets of direct attack.75 The two
categories of terrorist groups that control territory (those that are territorial but nongoverning as well as those that engage in state-building) operate in areas where
civilian objects—“all objects which are not military objectives” and are therefore
impermissible targets76—are likely to be located in close proximity to military
objects.77 But, in general, only one category—state-building terrorist groups—is
73
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characterized by the presence of many dual-use objects and institutions that cannot
easily be classified as either military or civilian (Table 2).
Table 2. A Typology of Objects Associated with Different Categories of Terrorist
Groups
Military Objects
1. Non-Territorial
2. Territorial but NonGoverning
3. State-Building

Civilian Objects

Dual-Use
Objects

X
X

X

X

X

X

For example, the Islamic State operates zakāt offices that are responsible
both for the collection of mandatory charitable contributions (functionally
equivalent to taxes) from civilians and the distribution of welfare benefits in the
form of food donations and cash assistance to the poor.78 Zakāt refers to a system
of almsgiving that is the third of the Five Pillars of Islam and therefore obligatory
on all Muslims with financial means.79 Traditionally, zakāt has been imposed on
savings and income at a rate of 2.5 percent, as specified in several of the hadith
(sayings of the Prophet transcribed by his followers).80 Zakāt may be paid in the
form of cash or other possessions such as livestock or agricultural produce.81
According to an official Islamic State video describing the institution of zakāt,
anyone who denies the obligation to pay zakāt is a kāfir (“unbeliever”), and anyone
who “resist[s] its payment with force” is guilty of apostasy from Islam.82 Since
apostasy is a capital crime in the Islamic State’s legal system, civilians can in theory
be executed for refusing to pay zakāt.83
According to the Islamic State, revenue obtained through the collection of
zakāt can be spent on the following: (1) “The poor who live in absolute poverty and
do not have enough to survive”; (2) “The poor who don’t ask others for financial
help and can’t meet their basic needs”; (3) “Those working to collect [zakāt]”; (4)
“To win the hearts of new Muslims or those considering Islam;” (5) “To set free
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Muslim slaves or liberate Muslim prisoners that were captured by the kuffar
[unbelievers]”; (6) “Those overburdened by debts”; (7) “The mujahidin and jihad”;
and (8) “Travelers in need.”84 Of these, only two pertain to actual warfare—(5) and
(7)—a third could be interpreted as supporting informational warfare through the
indoctrination of new recruits (4), and a fourth indirectly supports warfare by
paying the salaries of civilian employees (3). The remaining four areas of spending
concern the provision of welfare benefits for debtors, travelers, and the poor.85 In
January 2016, the Islamic State claimed to have distributed approximately $3.5
million U.S. dollars to more than 43,000 families in the Syrian provinces of Hama,
Deir Ezzor, Hassakah, Aleppo, Raqqa, and Homs during a single month.86 Local
newspapers,87 interviewees,88 and archival documents89 from Islamic Statecontrolled areas confirm that the group does provide assistance to the needy—in
the form of cash or food—but the amount of the distributions and number of
recipients cannot be independently verified. Zakāt offices, which simultaneously
collect revenue to finance military operations and provide welfare assistance to
civilians living in areas controlled by the Islamic State, illustrate the problem of
dual-use institutions in IHL. The hybridity of these offices, which are engaged in
both war-sustaining and humanitarian activities, poses a challenge for targeting
decisions.
The third defining characteristic of state-building terrorist groups is a degree
of coercive control over civilians that creates observational equivalence between
victims and supporters of the group. The Islamic State routinely coerces or outright
forces civilians into performing labor and services. For example, to compensate for
the destruction of many of its own vehicles by airstrikes, the Islamic State has
forced civilian truck drivers to work for the group in Mosul.90 The Islamic State has
also forced doctors to provide treatment to its fighters, sometimes at the expense of

84

al-Furqān Media, supra note 82, at 28 minutes, 38 seconds.
Id.
86
See Islamic State, ( اﻟﺰﻛﺎةZakāt), AMĀQ NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 22, 2016),
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CZVkwvEVAAE7lDf.jpg [https://perma.cc/TB63-39PX].
87
See ( داﻋﺶ ﯾﻔﺘﺢ ﺑﺎب اﻟﺘﻮﺑﺔ وﯾﻮزع زﻛﺎة اﻟﻨﻔﻂ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺮﻗﺔDaesh [the Islamic State] Opens the Door of
Repentance and Distributes Zakāt from Oil [Revenue] in Raqqa), EREM NEWS (Jul. 11, 2014),
https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/111760 [https://perma.cc/C2J8-3DUB].
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See WhatsApp Interview with Karim, Islamic State civilian employee in al-Mayadin, Syria (Feb.
12, 2016) (“At first, we were annoyed by the collection of zakāt, but when we saw [the Islamic
State] registering the names of the poor and giving them money and food, our admiration for them
increased. The money goes back to the people through the services that [the Islamic State]
provides.”).
89
See Islamic State, ( ﺟﺪول أﺳﻤﺎء اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺤﻘﯿﻦ ﻟﻠﺰﻛﺎةTable of Names of Those Entitled to Zakāt),
http://www.aymennjawad.org/jawad/pics/large/203.jpg [https://perma.cc/WBX4-JJGP] (document
recovered from a zakāt office in Manbij, Syria, reporting that 2,502 needy families (12,760
individuals) received a total of $755,837 in cash assistance over a two-month period in Aleppo,
Syria).
90
See ( داﻋﺶ ﯾﺮﺟﻊ ظﺎھﺮة اﻟﺴﺨﺮة اﻟﺼﺪاﻣﯿﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﯿﺎرات اﻟﺤﻤﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻮﺻﻞThe Islamic State Resurrects the
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their civilian patients.91 In one case in Raqqa, a patient died during surgery because
the doctor who was operating on him was forced to abandon the procedure to
perform a different operation on an injured Islamic State fighter.92 In both Libya
and Iraq, the Islamic State has reportedly executed doctors for refusing to treat its
wounded combatants.93 In another particularly egregious case of forced labor, the
Islamic State forced thousands of Yazidi women into sexual slavery and domestic
servitude,94 some of whom were reportedly killed while being transported in
Islamic State vehicles targeted by airstrikes.95 Civilians who refuse to work for the
Islamic State are often punished harshly. One prominent electrician from Mosul
was ordered to oversee the construction of tunnels.96 When he threatened to quit,
the Islamic State detained him for a week and threatened to abduct his sons.97
Forced labor is often imposed as a penalty for civilians who violate the
numerous rules of the Islamic State’s legal system, in addition to monetary fines
and corporal punishments that include public beatings, amputations, and
beheadings.98 Interviewees from Islamic State-controlled areas of Iraq and Syria
reported that the group forced prisoners to perform unpaid labor on construction
projects.99 In the eastern Syrian province of Deir Ezzor, civilians caught smoking,
breaking the fast during Ramadan, and wearing un-Islamic clothing have been
sentenced to perform hard labor including digging tunnels or trenches and carrying
91

See Wissam Youssef,  داﻋﺶ ﻣﻨﻊ ﻣﺼﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﺑﺄﻣﺮاض ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺼﯿﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻼج:( ﻣﻮﺻﻠﯿﻮنPeople of Mosul: Daesh
[the Islamic State] is Preventing Patients With Serious Injuries From Receiving Treatment)
AKHBAR AL-AAN (Nov. 26, 2016), goo.gl/pWECfo [https://perma.cc/E3TS-9ZPE] (doctors fleeing
Mosul reported that the Islamic State was “forcing medical teams to provide necessary services to
its fighters who were wounded in the battle over the city and forcing [civilian] patients to leave
Mosul hospitals under various pretexts” in order to accommodate these combatants).
92
See
Jorf
News,
FACEBOOK
(Jun.
18,
2017),
https://www.facebook.com/Jorfnews/posts/645926422273878 [https://perma.cc/P2K4-6Y8J] ( ﺗﻨﻈﯿﻢ
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 ﻣﺎ أدى ﻟﻮﻓﺎة اﻟﻤﺮﯾﺾ،“(اﻟﺘﻨﻈﯿﻢThe organization of Daesh [the Islamic State] is forcing a surgeon to
abandon his patient in the operating room in the Hospital of Modern Medicine in the city of Raqqa
to conduct an operation for one of the group’s fighters, leading to the death of the [civilian]
patient.”)).
93
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Executes an Indian Doctor After He Refused to Treat [Its Fighters]) AKHBAR AL-AAN (Feb. 23,
2017), goo.gl/s548Nu [https://perma.cc/HP53-XQMY]; داﻋﺶ ﯾﻌﺪم10 ( أطﺒﺎء ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻮﺻﻞDaesh [the
Islamic State] Executes 10 Doctors in Mosul) DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 8, 2015), goo.gl/ctqWkH
[https://perma.cc/43WA-DR8L].
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Doc.
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(Jun.
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https://twitter.com/soundandpic/status/867435919363772420 [https://perma.cc/K72D-843Z].
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See Lauren E. Bohn, What Has Life under ISIS Rule Been Like for Women?, THE GROUND TRUTH
PROJECT (Jul. 13, 2017), http://thegroundtruthproject.org/what-has-life-under-isis-rule-been-likefor-women/ [https://perma.cc/VRV7-GFC9].
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99
See Interviews with Basma, 32, civilian from Aleppo, in Gaziantep, Turkey (Jul. 2015); and with
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sandbags and concrete barriers, sometimes near the front lines.100 Also in Deir
Ezzor, detainees were coerced into donating blood for wounded fighters as a
condition for their release.101 A Twitter user in the Syrian city of Abu Kamal
reported in August 2015, “Daesh [the Islamic State] is forcing several detainees to
dig deep trenches around the outskirts of the city in intense heat.”102 In September
2015, the Islamic State reportedly forced Egyptian detainees to build a prison in the
Libyan city of Sirte.103 In another incident in July 2015, the Islamic State forced a
group of men to clean its headquarters in the Syrian village of al-Sirb after they
were caught smoking by the religious police.104 Since the legality of targeting any
particular individual depends not only on his or her status (combatant or civilian)
but also on conduct and behavior (civilians lose their protected status when they
directly participate in hostilities105), the Islamic State’s ability to coerce civilians
into performing activities that could easily be interpreted as supporting its military
operations has important implications for targeting decisions.
These three characteristics of state-building terrorist groups suggest the
following categories of membership: (1) members of the group’s military wing
(“military personnel”); (2) members of the group’s civilian wing (“civilian
employees”); and (3) members of the civilian population being governed (“civilian
subjects”). Only the first of these categories is present in all three categories of
terrorist groups (Table 3). The categories of “civilian employees” and “civilian
subjects” are unique to state-building terrorist groups. Although territorial but non100
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governing terrorist groups control land, they do not engage in governance of the
population therein (“civilian subjects”) and therefore have no need for civilian
employees to staff governing institutions.
Table 3. Categories of Membership in Terrorist Groups
1. Non-Territorial
2. Territorial but NonGoverning
3. State-Building

C.

Military Personnel
X

Civilian Employees

Civilian Subjects

X

X

X
X

Relevant Literature

In defining a new category of “state-building” terrorist groups and
illustrating the empirical implications of this category for existing principles of
targeting, this Article contributes to a nascent but growing body of empirical
research on IHL.106 In recent years, there has been considerable progress in the
application of empirical research methods to important questions and concerns in
international law including the conditions under which international courts are most
effective107 the impact of treaty ratification on human rights violations,108 the
impact of international institutions on trade commitments,109 the relationship
between bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment flows between
contracting states,110 and the rising costs of peace treaties.111 Within the subfield of
106

See generally James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 559 (2007); Benjamin A. Valentino et al., Covenants without the Sword: International Law
and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War, 58 WORLD POL. 339 (2006).
107
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International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2004) (finding, through an
empirical analysis of International Court of Justice decisions, that international courts are most
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108
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L. J. 1935, 1940
(2002) (finding that states that ratify human rights agreements are, counter-intuitively, more likely
to violate these agreements than other states, on average).
109
See Jeffrey Kucik & Eric Reinhardt, Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to
the Global Trade Regime, 62 INT’L. ORG. 477, 479 (2008) (finding that states that take advantage
of the World Trade Organization’s flexibility provisions agree, on average, to more and deeper tariff
commitments and implement lower tariffs in practice than states that do not use these provisions).
110
See Jason W. Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of
(International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 L. & SOC. REV. 805, 807
(2008) (finding, after disaggregating 1,000 BITs into “strong” and “weak” treaties, that the stronger
BITs are not associated with increased investment). But see Tim Büthe & Helen V. Milner, Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: A Political Analysis, in THE EFFECT OF
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE
TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 198 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009)
(finding that membership in multilateral and preferential trade agreements results in increased
overall foreign direct investment flows into a country).
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Tanisha M. Fazal, The Demise of Peace Treaties in Interstate War, 67 INT’L. ORG. 695, 696
(2013) (arguing that the emergence of the modern canon of the law of war has raised the costs of
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empirical IHL scholarship, previous work has explored the effects of treaty
ratification on civilian casualties112 and other determinants of state compliance with
the laws of war.113 However, all of these studies are concerned with inter-state
warfare, and there has been almost no empirical research on aspects of IHL that
concern non-state actors in non-international armed conflicts. Similarly, the effects
of counter-terrorism laws and policies remain poorly understood,114 although
numerous journalists, analysts, and lawyers have theorized that torture and extraterritorial detention have negative externalities for U.S. national security.115 It has
also been suggested that U.S. drone strikes and airstrikes, when they harm civilian
bystanders and infrastructure, increase local support for terrorist groups,116 and that
concerns about the legality of drone strikes have undermined intelligence sharing

admitting to being in a state of war and has therefore contributed to a decrease in the rate at which
interstate conflicts have ended with a formal peace treaty).
112
See Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth & Sarah Croco, Covenants Without the Sword: International
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113
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When Do States Follow the Laws of War? 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 559, 570 (2007) (finding that
democracies are more likely to comply with the laws of war than are authoritarian states); Alyssa
K. Prorok & Benjamin J. Appel, Democratic Third Parties and Civilian Targeting in Interstate War,
58 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 713, 731 (2014) (finding, with a dataset on interstate wars from 1990 to
2003, that democratic third parties play a role in inducing compliance with IHL).
114
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with U.S. allies.117 However, with a few exceptions,118 these causal claims have yet
to be persuasively substantiated with data.
This Article contributes to an emerging empirical literature on the
relationship between IHL and non-state actors by addressing the questions: How
are state-building terrorist groups different from other types of terrorist groups, and
what are the implications of these differences for the targeting of personnel and
objects? One reason for the scarcity of empirical research on the inner workings of
terrorist groups—and the resulting implications for IHL—is that collecting data on
these groups raises security, legal, and ethical concerns for researchers. First,
traveling to and conducting research in conflict areas where terrorist groups operate
poses obvious security risks. Second, the United States government and Supreme
Court have defined the crime of “material support” for terrorism broadly,119 and it
is possible—although unlikely—that researchers who communicate directly with
members of terrorist organizations and publish the findings of those interviews
could be prosecuted for indirectly helping these groups spread their messages. This
is particularly true if the researcher conducts interviews in a foreign language and
translates the responses into English, since “translation” has been identified as a
type of service that potentially falls within the scope of the material support
definition.120 Third, interviewing members of terrorist groups or civilians who have
had contact with such groups inevitably exposes these persons to risks and therefore
raises important research ethics concerns.121 These risks include, for current or
former members of terrorist groups, the possibility of physical harm or prosecution
if compromising information disclosed during an interview is inadvertently
disclosed to others by the researcher or confiscated by government authorities who
might use it for counter-terrorism purposes. Although these challenges make it
difficult for researchers to obtain information about clandestine and illegal
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2015)
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https://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/media/documents/research_seminar_papers/lyall-airstrikesapr2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLC2-TGQJ] (finding that “insurgent organizations step up their
violence after air operations to maintain their reputations for resolve in the eyes of local
populations”). See also Luke Condra & Jacob Shapiro, Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects
of Collateral Damage, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 175 (2012) (finding that “Coalition-caused civilian
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119
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organizations, including terrorist groups, they are not insurmountable.122 Data
collection in conflict areas is both possible and necessary for evidence-based
policies. The arguments advanced in this Article are supported by original data
collected over the course of five months of fieldwork in Turkey and Iraq, including
in Mosul, conducted for the author’s dissertation. The Appendix discusses the
research methodology and sources of data in greater detail.
IV.

Implications of State-Building Terrorist Groups for the Targeting of
Personnel

Current legal frameworks and policies governing the targeting of personnel
in armed conflicts were not designed to account for the unique characteristics of
state-building terrorist groups and, in particular, their reliance on civilian
employees. The following sections use original data collected by the author on the
Islamic State to support this Article’s argument that existing doctrines of lethal
targeting tend to penalize civilians when applied to state-building terrorist groups.
Specifically, the application of these doctrines to a group such as the Islamic State
can result in the mischaracterization of civilian employees and other civilian
residents of territory controlled by the group as military personnel who can be
targeted under IHL.
As a threshold issue, this Article focuses on the targeting of Islamic State
personnel and objects in the group’s core territories of Iraq and Syria. The United
States is currently engaged in armed conflict with the Islamic State in both of these
countries. The classification of the conflict—as either an international armed
conflict (IAC), a non-international armed conflict (NIAC), or a combination of
both—is important because IACs and NIACs are governed by different
international legal frameworks. IACs refer to conflicts between state parties and are
governed by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocol I.123
NIACs refer to armed conflicts in which one or more non-state armed groups are
involved and are governed by Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions
(Common Article 3).124 A subset of NIACs—those in which an armed group is
under “responsible command” and “exercise[s] such control over a part of [the state
party’s] territory as to enable [the group] to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations,” as the Islamic State does—trigger the application of
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Additional Protocol II, which supplements Common Article 3 with additional
protections for victims of armed conflict.125
Since Iraq has consented to the United States’ use of force against the
Islamic State within its territory, the classification of that part of the conflict as a
NIAC is relatively straightforward.126 The classification of the conflict in Syria is
considerably more complicated for reasons that are beyond the scope of this
article.127 Some scholars have interpreted the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC)’s 2016 Commentary on the First Geneva Convention to support the
conclusion that both an IAC and NIAC are present in Syria due to the U.S. use of
force without the consent of the Syrian government, although critics of this
interpretation argue that non-consensual intervention does not necessarily trigger
an IAC.128 Given the fluidity of the Syrian conflict, this Article does not take a
position on its classification. Regardless of the disputed existence of an IAC in
Syria, the following discussion of the characteristics of state-building terrorist
groups and corresponding implications for targeting is relevant for U.S. operations
in its NIAC with the Islamic State.
A.

Civilian Employees of State-Building Terrorist Groups are Entitled
to Protection

The current counter-terrorism paradigm relies on a problematic assumption
that terrorist groups are primarily military organizations. In developing principles
of detention and targeting for operations against al-Qaeda, the U.S. government
took the position that “[al-Qaeda] is an organized armed group, a military
125
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organization, through and through, with no ‘civilian’ wing, and that therefore
membership in [al-Qaeda] is analogous to being an enlistee in the U.S. armed
forces, making one targetable on that ground alone.”129 In its Brief in Opposition to
certiorari in the al-Bihani case, the government argued the following against the
petitioner’s claim that al-Bihani, a Yemeni citizen who admitted to joining alQaeda but claimed to have only worked as a cook, should be considered a “civilian
contractor” of the group: “Unlike a sovereign nation with a civilian population, [alQaeda] is a terrorist organization engaged in an armed conflict with the United
States, and it has no ‘non-military’ wing.”130 According to this view, anyone
working for al-Qaeda in any capacity—regardless of the nature of the work
performed—is a combatant for purposes of detention, and by implication, targeting.
This is true even of administrative and service-providing personnel such as
cleaners, drivers, and cooks like al-Bihani, because their designation as combatants
is status- rather than conduct-based. In December of 2016, the U.S. government
again asserted its ability to target members of armed groups based on formal
membership regardless of their functional role: “[A]n individual who is formally or
functionally a member of an armed group against which the United States is
engaged in an armed conflict is generally targetable.”131
The U.S. position that formal membership alone is sufficient grounds for
targeting diverges from that of the ICRC, which maintains that functional
membership is a requirement for targeting.132 Nonetheless, the ICRC appears to
assume, like the United States, that all “members” of armed groups, including those
that engage in terrorism, are combatants, although the ICRC acknowledges that
civilians may play supporting roles as non-members. This assumption is embedded
in the ICRC’s definition of “membership” in an armed group: “[T]he decisive
criterion for individual membership . . . is whether a person assumes a continuous
function for the group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities.”133
Individuals who are engaged full-time in the preparation, execution, or command
of activities amounting to direct participation in hostilities are said to assume “a
continuous combat function.”134 In contrast, individuals who merely accompany or
support an organized armed group continuously, but whose function does not
involve direct participation in hostilities, “are not members of that group within the
meaning of IHL.”135 This definition of membership is appropriate for organizations
129
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such as al-Qaeda, but does not reflect the full range of personnel employed by statebuilding terrorist groups that can be differentiated into military and civilian wings.
Such civilian wings are staffed by employees who do not participate in hostilities
but nonetheless are sufficiently integrated into the group’s structure to be
considered “members.”
As illustrated by the typology presented in Table 1, not all terrorist groups
share al-Qaeda’s structure. Nonetheless, U.S. counter-terrorism policy has been
heavily shaped by the model of al-Qaeda, resulting in a one-size-fits-all targeting
framework. The Obama Administration’s targeting policies seemed to endorse the
view that members of terrorist groups are combatants by definition.136 According
to a speech by former State Department Legal Adviser Brian Egan, relevant factors
for the determination of membership in an “organized armed group” include:
the extent to which the individual performs functions for the benefit
of the group that are analogous to those traditionally performed by
members of State militaries that are liable to attack; is carrying out
or giving orders to others within the group to perform such
functions; or has undertaken certain acts that reliably indicate
meaningful integration into the group.137
The analogy to “state militaries” suggests that this definition does not contemplate
the possibility that an armed group might include civilian employees.
The assumption embedded in the current counter-terrorism paradigm—that
members of terrorist groups cannot be civilians—may be appropriate for al-Qaeda,
but it is inconsistent with the realities of state-building terrorist groups that govern
people and territory. The Islamic State presents new dilemmas and challenges for
the interpretation of existing targeting principles because the group employs
significant numbers of civilian personnel in non-military institutions that provide
services to the governed population. As a de facto state, the group maintains not
only an army but also a complex bureaucracy that collects taxes and provides basic
services to civilians.138 Employees of the Islamic State’s bureaucracy are civilian
personnel who generally do not undergo military training, do not carry weapons,
and are often not even required to swear allegiance to the Islamic State, according
to interviews with Iraqis and Syrians who have worked for this bureaucracy.139 In
the context of state militaries, the ICRC’s view is that “private contractors and
employees of a party to an armed conflict who are civilians . . . are entitled to
protection against direct attack” unless they relinquish their protected status by
136
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directly participating in hostilities or are effectively incorporated into the state’s
armed forces by being assigned to perform “a continuous combat function.”140
Similarly, civilian employees of armed groups with state-like bureaucracies are
functionally civilians.
An official Islamic State document entitled, “Principles in the
Administration of the Islamic State,” describes a strategy of capturing and coopting
existing institutions and infrastructure.141 Rather than build new institutions from
scratch, the Islamic State takes over existing institutions and simply replaces the
senior management while allowing lower-level personnel to keep their jobs,
thereby “preserving the capabilities that managed projects under previous
governments, while taking into account the need to place strict oversights and an
administration affiliated with the Islamic State.”142 Interviews with employees of a
hospital and municipal service department previously controlled by the Islamic
State in Mosul revealed that only the senior managers were required to swear an
oath of allegiance.143 Former Islamic State combatants, interviewed at a detention
facility in Kurdistan, confirmed that the vast majority of civilian employees
working in the fields of education, healthcare, sanitation, and other municipal
services did not swear an oath of allegiance.144 Yet they received salaries from the
Islamic State, worked in buildings marked with the group’s logo, and were clearly
a part of its workforce.
The swearing of an oath of allegiance, known as bayʿah in Islamic legal
terminology, is worth highlighting because it has been cited by U.S. courts as
evidence of membership in al-Qaeda.145 The swearing of an oath is an ineffective
test of membership in the Islamic State for two reasons. First, as explained above,
the group has a large number of unsworn civilian employees. Second, the Islamic
State has in many cases coerced pledges of allegiance that should not be interpreted
as genuine expressions of support. For example, the Islamic State published
propaganda photographs that purportedly showed tribal leaders in Fallujah
pledging allegiance to the group, but an Iraqi commentator concluded, “It is clear
from their body language and their facial expressions and the movement of their
140
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tongues that they were forced to swear an oath at gunpoint.”146 Similarly, in Mosul,
the Islamic State reportedly used “methods of threat and intimidation” to extract
pledges of allegiance from tribal leaders “against their will.”147
Economic coercion also plays a role in the extraction of cooperation from
civilians. In the Syrian city of Abu Kamal, the Islamic State ordered doctors and
pharmacists to swear bayʿah and make weekly medical missions to the front lines
in Iraq.148 Those who refused were punished with the revocation of their licenses
and closure of their businesses. 149 The swearing of an oath, although relevant for
determining membership in al-Qaeda, says very little about the nature of a person’s
relationship with the Islamic State. This is because the group’s coercive power over
civilians living in territory under its control gives rise to observational equivalence
between supporters and victims.
The evidence presented above leads to the conclusion that the Islamic State
is not only a military organization but also a quasi-state that employs (or forcibly
conscripts) large numbers of civilian employees who do not perform any combat
functions, much less “continuous” combat functions. Existing principles of
targeting should be refined to differentiate between targetable combatants and
civilian employees. Although civilian employees may be liable for providing
material support for terrorism under domestic criminal laws, they may not be
lethally targeted unless they relinquish their protected status by directly
participating in hostilities, as discussed in the following section. Differentiating
between military and civilian employees of state-building terrorist groups is
necessary to prevent the mischaracterization of civilians as combatants.
B.

State-Building Terrorist Groups May Coerce Civilians Into
“Directly Participating in Hostilities”

A bedrock principle of IHL is the requirement of distinction, which
ordinarily prohibits the targeting of civilians.150 However, civilians lose their
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protected status “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” under Article
51(3) of Additional Protocol I.151 The Geneva Conventions did not elaborate on the
types of conduct that would constitute direct participation in hostilities, but the
ICRC’s interpretive guidance suggests a tripartite test consisting of the following
elements: (1) threshold of harm, (2) direct causation, and (3) belligerent nexus.152
Under this test, a civilian truck driver who delivers ammunition to the front line
would be considered a direct participant in hostilities, but one who transports
ammunition from a factory to a port far removed from the battlefield would not
meet the test of “directly” causing harm.153
In the context of IACs, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has
enumerated several activities that do not rise to the level of direct participation in
hostilities: “general contributions made by citizens to their State’s war effort (e.g.,
buying war bonds or paying taxes to the government that will ultimately be used to
fund the armed forces)”; “police services (e.g., police officers who maintain public
order against common criminals during armed conflict)”; and “working in a
munitions factory or other factory that is not in geographic or temporal proximity
to military operations but that is supplying weapons, materiel, and other goods
useful to the armed forces of a State.”154 As these examples illustrate, targeting
decisions depend not only on a person’s status (civilian or combatant) but also on
his or her conduct (whether or not a civilian’s behavior amounts to direct
participation in hostilities).
This conduct-based test raises concerns when applied to state-building
terrorist groups such as the Islamic State because, as argued earlier, a characteristic
of these groups is a degree of coercive control over civilians that gives rise to
observational equivalence between victims and supporters. To compensate for
casualties and defections, the Islamic State has begun to “transfer” civilian
employees from administrative jobs in its tax-collecting and service-providing
offices to the military, where they are trained for combat and deployed to the
battlefield.155 Such employees can fairly be characterized as civilians directly
participating in hostilities and would lose their protected status for so long as they
serve in combat roles.
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But in cases where the Islamic State conscripts its civilian subjects, rather
than civilian employees, it is far less clear if and how the doctrine should apply.
When the Islamic State forces civilian prisoners to dig trenches and build defensive
fortifications at the front lines, as has occurred repeatedly in Iraq and Syria,156 can
their conduct be interpreted as direct participation in hostilities, thereby rendering
them targetable? What about civilian truck drivers forced by the Islamic State to
transport munitions against their will?157 And in a particularly grotesque example,
what is the status of children158 and mentally handicapped159 individuals who are
involuntarily chained inside explosive-laden vehicles and forced to drive them in
suicide operations? Air Force Brigadier General Matt Isler reported seeing such
drivers veer off course and hide: “We see [Islamic State] command and control
trying to figure out where their [Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
(VBIED)] driver’s gone, we’ve seen multiple VBIED drivers going AWOL.”160 As
these examples illustrate, the Islamic State’s ability to coerce civilians into directly
participating in hostilities against their will has important implications for lethal
targeting policies.
V.

Implications of State-Building Terrorist Groups for the Targeting of
Objects

Customary international law requires that all parties to a conflict distinguish
between civilian and military objectives, and that attacks may only be directed
against military objectives.161 The application of these principles is relatively
straightforward for obviously military assets such as munitions factories and bases,
but some objects cannot be easily classified as either military or civilian. Statebuilding terrorist groups present unique difficulties for the classification of objects
because such groups are characterized by the presence of large numbers of dualuse objects and institutions that simultaneously perform military and civilian
functions.
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A.

The Legal Basis for Targeting War-Sustaining Objects Is
Questionable.

Dual-use objects belong to an intermediate category of objects that have
both military and civilian functions (such as communications infrastructure and
modes of transportation).162 The targeting of dual-use objects is controversial
because of the potential for “reverberating” collateral effects on the civilian
population.163 Such objects may only be attacked so long as the harm to the civilian
population is not excessive in comparison with the anticipated military
advantage.164 Some dual-use objects are considered “war-sustaining” because they
generate revenue used to fund an enemy’s armed forces.165 The permissibility of
targeting war-sustaining objects under IHL is disputed. Some scholars have argued
that war-sustaining objects that generate revenue used to fund an enemy’s armed
forces may be targeted, even if some of the revenue is used for non-military
purposes related to the governance of civilians, so long as targeting decisions are
subject to a proportionality analysis and limiting principles.166 Others have
expressed the concern that expanding the scope of targetable objects to include
“war-sustaining” industries and infrastructure leads to “a very steep and slippery
slope” with the potential to cause “considerable humanitarian suffering.”167
Although controversial, the doctrine of war-sustaining objects has been
embraced by the U.S. government since at least the late 1980s.168 In its Military
Commissions Act of 2009, the United States adopted criteria that permit an attack
on objects that by “their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to
the war-fighting or war-sustaining capability of an opposing force.”169 The Obama
Administration appeared to endorse this argument by striking banks,170 “cash
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collection and distribution point[s],”171 “storage sites where ISIL holds its cash,”172
as well as oil wells, refineries, and tanker trucks.173 The U.S. approach is less
restrictive than that of Additional Protocol I’s Article 52(2) because it permits the
targeting of objects that only indirectly contribute to military operations. Under
Article 52(2), an attack on an armed group’s taxation system would be unlawful,
but it might be permissible under the U.S. approach if the destruction of the taxation
system—although only indirectly war-sustaining—would offer a definite military
advantage.174
For a non-territorial and non-governing terrorist group such as al-Qaeda, the
group’s institutions and infrastructure are, for the most part, unambiguously
military in nature. But for state-building terrorist groups like the Islamic State,
which simultaneously conducts military operations while governing territory and
people, the problems of dual-use and war-sustaining objects are particularly salient.
State-building terrorist groups tend to create hybrid institutions that simultaneously
perform war-sustaining and service-providing functions. For example, the Islamic
State’s zakāt offices are responsible both for the collection of taxes from civilians
(revenue that is used to finance military operations) and the charitable distribution
of cash assistance and food to the poor (humanitarian aid).175 The U.S.-led Coalition
has repeatedly targeted the Islamic State’s zakāt offices in Iraq and Syria,176 but it
is unclear whether the military advantage derived from these airstrikes outweighs
the potentially significant cost to civilians, as the principle of proportionality
requires. Such proportionality assessments would need to take into account several
types of civilians likely to be found inside or in close proximity to zakāt offices:
civilian employees, recipients of charitable distributions, and bystanders. In
contrast, proportionality assessments for obviously military objectives such as
munitions factories177 are more straightforward because, under customary
171
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international law, the presence of civilians within or near these objectives does not
render them immune to attack.178
Data collected by the author for this article indicates that zakāt offices have
been hit by airstrikes on at least nineteen different occasions in eleven different
cities and towns.179 In another incident, an airstrike targeted the home of a zakāt
official in Mosul, although this event was excluded from the count of nineteen
incidents because the official was targeted outside of the zakāt office.180 Fourteen
of these strikes were attributed to the U.S.-led Coalition, one to the Syrian
government, and four were unattributed. Destroying such dual-use objects may
constitute a definite military advantage by reducing the Islamic State’s revenues,
but at the expense of civilians who rely on these institutions for food and other
humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, if the employees of zakāt offices are
considered to be civilians—as I argue they should be—then they are entitled to
protection and should be taken into account in proportionality assessments.
B.

Targeting Dual-Use Objects of State-Building Terrorist Groups Has
Negative Policy Consequences.

The legal basis for targeting war-sustaining objects such as zakāt offices is
questionable, but even if we accept the legality of the nineteen airstrikes
documented in this paper, they are misguided as a matter of policy. The targeting
of zakāt offices has been criticized by Iraqi and Syrian civilians who consider them
to be civilian institutions that have been captured by the Islamic State but
nonetheless continue to perform primarily humanitarian and service-providing
functions. Mosul Eye, an anonymous blog based in Mosul, issued the following
statement in response to the targeting of three banks and a zakāt office on February
13, 2016: “The banks were totally empty of any cash and we still do not understand
why the coalition still insists on targeting empty banks. We request that the
Coalition issue an explanation for the targeting of ‘civilian’ sites that are not a part
of the Islamic State. Rather, these sites are part of the infrastructure of the city of
Mosul.”181 The Coalition’s official report for February 12 claims that one airstrike
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“destroyed three ISIL fighting positions”182 and the report for February 13 claims
that “two airstrikes struck an ISIL tactical unit and destroyed two ISIL fighting
positions and an ISIL armored excavator”183—both “near Mosul”—but there is no
mention of any strike on economic infrastructure. Aside from the uncertain legality
of targeting banks and zakāt offices, the discrepancy between the Coalition’s
version of events and that reported by residents of Mosul threatens to undermine
the credibility and legitimacy of U.S.-led military operations in the eyes of civilians.
The Islamic State has capitalized on the targeting of zakāt offices in densely
populated areas—and accompanying civilian casualties and collateral damage—to
fuel local anger toward the U.S.-led Coalition. After the targeting of a zakāt office
in the Iraqi city of al-Qa’im on January 31, 2015, the Islamic State released
propaganda photographs purporting to show the damage—civilian injuries and
property damage—“caused by the [U.S.-led Coalition] airstrike to a group of poor
Muslims as they were receiving food aid from the warehouse of the office of
zakāt.”184 As these examples illustrate, the targeting of dual-use objects in the
context of state-building terrorist groups can lead to the destruction of serviceproviding and humanitarian institutions such as zakāt offices, with negative
consequences for public opinion toward counter-insurgents. This finding is
consistent with recent scholarship arguing that the use of drones in civilianpopulated areas away from active hostilities is associated with “strategic costs and
negative secondary effects.”185
Other dual-use objects include power stations that provide electricity for
military purposes (such as munitions factories and training camps) and civilian
purposes (hospitals and municipal services). In the context of state-building
terrorist groups, the targeting of dual-use objects that are in close spatial proximity
to civilian objects such as water sources can have particularly negative externalities
for public health. Damage to water treatment infrastructure in Raqqa has been
blamed for the spread of illnesses including viral hepatitis, leishmaniasis,
gastroenteritis, and pneumonia.186 Existing targeting frameworks that were
designed for non-territorial and non-governing terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda
182
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tend to penalize civilians when applied to state-building terrorist groups that govern
people and territory.
VI.

Recommendations

The current U.S. counter-terrorism paradigm relies heavily on empirical
assumptions that apply to some but not all terrorist groups. Specifically, this Article
has leveraged evidence from the case of the Islamic State to argue that statebuilding terrorist groups can be differentiated from other terrorist groups by three
characteristics: (1) the presence of a non-military wing analogous to a civilian
bureaucracy that provides services to the governed population; (2) dual-use
institutions that simultaneously perform military and civilian functions; and (3) a
degree of coercive control over civilians that creates observational equivalence
between victims and supporters of the group. All three of these characteristics have
important implications for the targeting of personnel and objects under the laws of
war.
First, unlike al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups that do not control territory
or govern people, the Islamic State has developed a complex bureaucracy staffed
by civilian employees who provided services to the local population. Although it
can plausibly be argued that al-Qaeda “has no ‘civilian’ wing,”187 the same
argument cannot be applied to the Islamic State based on overwhelming evidence
of the group’s reliance on “civilian employees” working in administrative and
service-providing institutions including schools and hospitals. These civilian
employees are entitled to protection under the laws of war and must be taken into
account in proportionality assessments, but importantly, they can still be held
accountable for aiding the Islamic State under domestic material support laws.
Second, state-building terrorist groups like the Islamic State tend to create hybrid
institutions that simultaneously perform war-sustaining and service-providing
functions. For example, the Islamic State’s zakāt offices are responsible both for
the collection of taxes from civilians (revenue that is used to finance military
operations) and the charitable distribution of cash assistance and food to the poor
(humanitarian aid).188 The U.S.-led Coalition has repeatedly targeted zakāt offices
in Iraq and Syria,189 but it is unclear whether the military advantage derived from
these airstrikes outweighs the potentially significant cost to civilians, as the
principle of proportionality requires. Third, as a result of its control over territory
and the means of violence therein, the Islamic State has the ability to coerce
civilians into cooperating with the group against their will, including by directly
participating in hostilities (for example, in cases where the Islamic State has forced
children and mentally handicapped individuals to conduct suicide operations).
These findings suggest the following recommendations. First is the
recognition of a new category of “civilian employees” who are “members” of state187
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building terrorist groups—insofar as they are paid by the group and work within its
administrative and service-providing institutions such as schools and municipal
departments—but nonetheless maintain their status as civilians and therefore must
be taken into account in proportionality assessments. This recommendation
balances the legal and moral obligation to protect civilians living in areas governed
by terrorist groups—who are extremely vulnerable to coercion and exploitation for
reasons discussed in this article—against the legitimate interests of the United
States and other governments in countering the threats that these groups pose to
national security and global stability. Civilian employees may become targetable if
they relinquish their civilian status by directly participating in hostilities, and they
may also be prosecuted for aiding terrorist groups under domestic material support
laws.
Second, in light of the large number of dual-use and war-sustaining objects
present in areas controlled and governed by terrorist groups, the United States
should—in cases of doubt as to how an object should be classified—presume that
the object is not being used to make an effective contribution to military action.190
The DOD has taken the position that this presumption is not part of customary
international law because “such a rule would shift the burden of determining the
precise use of an object from the defender to the attacker.”191 However, I argue that
the structural vulnerability of civilians living in areas controlled by state-building
terrorist groups warrants a heightened standard of care. Furthermore, the United
States should consider adopting a standard of “protective proportionality,” which
has been recommended for “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population,”192 as defined in Additional Protocol I.193 Examples of such objects
include drinking water installations and power plants. It is conceivable that an
Islamic State zakāt office could fall within the definition if it were providing enough
food to civilians to be considered “indispensable” to their survival. At a minimum,
even under an ordinary standard of proportionality, the United States should take
into account civilian employees of zakāt offices in weighing the potential harm
against the anticipated military advantage.
Third, in recognition of the Islamic State’s ability to coerce civilians into
directly participating in hostilities against their will, the United States should
consider the ICRC’s guidance that, in “exceptional situations,” the mental state of
civilians may “call into question the belligerent nexus of their conduct,” for
example, in cases where civilians are “totally unaware of the role they are playing
190
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in the conduct of hostilities . . . or when they are completely deprived of their
physical freedom of action.”194 According to this logic, civilians cannot be regarded
as performing a voluntary action and therefore remain protected against direct
attack “despite the belligerent nexus of the military operation in which they are
being instrumentalized.”195 In cases where the Islamic State forces civilians,
including children and mentally handicapped individuals, to conduct suicide
bombings or other operations against their will, such civilians should not be
regarded as performing a voluntary action. Although it may be difficult or
impossible to inquire into the mental state of civilians directly participating in
hostilities, Coalition forces should at least consider the possibility that civilians may
have been conscripted against their will, in which case they are likely amenable to
surrender.
Fourth, as a procedural matter, the United States should develop and
publicize targeting guidelines that are tailored to the unique characteristics of statebuilding terrorist groups including the Islamic State. These guidelines should
clearly define the categories of objects and persons who are targetable in order to
give fair warning to civilians in Islamic State-controlled areas. Civilians cannot be
expected to refrain from conduct that renders them targetable, and to avoid
targetable locations, if they do not know where the lines between permissible and
prohibited behavior lie. This recommendation would directly address civilians’
demands for greater transparency in targeting decisions, as articulated by one
influential Mosul-based blogger who wrote: “We request that the Coalition issue
an explanation for the targeting of ‘civilian’ sites that are not a part of the Islamic
State.”196 It would also create incentives for civilians to refrain from conduct that
would render them targetable and to stay away from targetable objects, which
would likely reduce civilian casualties. These targeting guidelines should not only
be reported to Congress and subject to public debate but also translated into Arabic,
disseminated to local Syrian and Iraqi newspapers, and dropped as leaflets into
Islamic State-controlled territories.
VII.

Conclusion

The recommendations discussed above, if implemented, would help to
bridge the current gap between outdated targeting principles that were designed for
al-Qaeda and the realities of the Islamic State and other state-building terrorist
groups. They would also help to ensure that civilians are not unjustly penalized for
merely living and working (as non-combatants) in an area that happens to be
controlled and governed by a terrorist group. Failure to appreciate the ways in
which state-building terrorist groups differ from those that do not govern territory
and people may result in the mischaracterization of civilians as combatants, and of
civilian or dual-use objects as military objectives. Although the Islamic State has
been mostly expelled from Iraq and is in the process of retreating to a shrinking
194
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corner of Syria, many analysts predict that the group—which has a long history of
adaptation and reinvention—will survive underground and eventually reconstitute
itself as an “ISIS 2.0.”197 Regardless of the future of the Islamic State, as the history
of jihadist movements since the Arab Spring has demonstrated, the Islamic State is
not the first state-building terrorist group that has threatened the United States and
its allies, and it is unlikely to be the last. To ensure the effectiveness and legitimacy
of U.S. military operations in Iraq, Syria, and other conflict areas, it is imperative
that targeting policies be refined to account for the unique characteristics of statebuilding terrorist groups.
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Appendix
This Article is informed by five months of field research conducted by the
author between July 2015 and April 2017 in the Turkish cities of Antakya,
Gaziantep, Reyhanlı, and Şanlıurfa and in the Iraqi cities of Erbil and Mosul.198
Evidence cited in the Article includes: (1) interviews with key informants who have
lived in Islamic State-controlled areas of Syria and Iraq including former Islamic
State fighters and civilian employees; (2) social media data generated by
individuals living in or near Islamic State-controlled areas; (3) official statements
and archival documents produced by the Islamic State; and (4) local Arabiclanguage newspapers. The second and fourth sources of data were used to assemble
a new dataset on the targeting of 11 Islamic State zakāt offices on 19 different
occasions.
The Article draws on a set of interviews with 159 individuals who have
lived in Islamic State-controlled areas of Iraq and Syria. Interviewees were
identified through “snowball sampling” and selected on the basis of their personal
experiences with the Islamic State. Snowball sampling, also known as chainreferral sampling, is a nonrandom sampling technique in which the researcher
begins with a small number of contacts from the target population (in this case,
individuals with knowledge of Islamic State institutions and personnel) and
leverages those contacts for introductions to other members of the population.
Snowball sampling is often the only way to access clandestine populations,
including members of armed groups, who tend to be distrustful of outsiders as a
result of the illicit nature of their activities.199 This method is particularly helpful in
conflict areas, where attitudes of distrust and suspicion are heightened by fear of
violence.200 The 159 interviewees have had a variety of experiences with Islamic
State governance: all of them have lived in or traveled through Islamic Statecontrolled areas; 52 have paid taxes to the Islamic State; 27 have a relative, friend,
or neighbor who used an Islamic State court; 41 have a relative, friend, or neighbor
who joined the Islamic State; and 18 have been arrested or imprisoned by the
Islamic State. I have interviewed 24 former combatants and 21 former civilian
employees of the Islamic State including teachers, doctors, engineers, truck drivers,
an accountant, a graphic designer, and a cook. Additionally, I have conducted
interviews over online messaging applications with 11 Islamic State combatants or
employees and eight civilian supporters who, at the time of the interview, were
living or fighting in Syria and Iraq (see Appendix Table I).
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A second source of evidence upon which this Article relies is social media
data (Twitter and Facebook posts) generated by internet users in or near Islamic
State-controlled areas describing events therein. Given the inaccessibility of these
areas to researchers, such data provides rare insights into events and experiences
that would otherwise be invisible to outsiders. Social media data was collected
using the Twitter search API (Application Program Interface) and the Facebook
search API for public posts.
Third, the Article cites official documents and statements produced by the
Islamic State itself. The Islamic State’s bureaucracy has generated a vast number
of documents including: (1) several different forms of propaganda directed at both
international and local audience; (2) rules, religious edicts, and codes of conduct
aimed at regulating the behavior of its own personnel and the civilians they govern;
and (3) court verdicts and other rule-enforcing decisions. Some of these documents
(particularly propaganda) are widely circulated by Islamic State members or
supporters over social media and messaging applications, while other documents
not intended for public distribution have been smuggled out of Islamic Statecontrolled territory by civilians or combatants, either as hard copies or photographs
of the originals. Although Islamic State personnel often destroy incriminating
documents in territory that they anticipate losing, many archives have been
discovered in areas from which the group has retreated.201 Given that civilians and
combatants involved with the Islamic State are often reluctant to share potentially
incriminating information with researchers, these documents are a vital
complement to interview data.
Fourth, the Article also relies on evidence from local Arabic-language
newspapers that report on events in Islamic State-controlled areas of Syria and Iraq
with greater frequency and specificity than Western media outlets. I triangulated
between these newspapers and the abovementioned sources of social media data
(Twitter and Facebook posts) to assemble a new dataset that documents all known
airstrikes targeting 11 Islamic State zakāt offices on 19 different occasions
(Appendix Table II).202 These zakāt offices, which are located in densely populated
areas and simultaneously collect taxes (a war-sustaining activity) and distribute
cash assistance and food to impoverished civilians (a humanitarian activity), are an
example of “dual-use” institutions that simultaneously perform military and
civilian functions. Although other Islamic State institutions may be classified as
dual-use—for example, factories that produce plastic and cement may be used for
military purposes (bomb-making and fortifications) or civilian purposes (water
treatment and the repair of damaged infrastructure, and Islamic State “schools”
201

Loveday Morris & Mustafa Salim, A File on Islamic State’s “Problem” Foreign Fighters Shows
Some
are
Refusing
to
Fight,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
7,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/a-file-on-islamic-states-problem-foreignfighters-shows-some-are-refusing-to-fight/2017/02/06/694cdaa0-e664-11e6-903d9b11ed7d8d2a_story.html?utm_term=.f019dc2061e0 [https://perma.cc/Q8JW-U947].
202
A folder containing the original source files (social media data and local Arabic-language
newspapers) used to assemble the dataset of airstrikes is available at the following link:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/199e6k80nfikk0p/AAD7bfY_8buwgWe0spn2QLuqa?dl=0.

142

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 9

simultaneously provide education and engage in military recruiting and training—
this Article focuses on the example of zakāt offices because they appear to have
been systematically targeted by airstrikes in numerous well-documented incidents.
Schools and cement factories have also been targeted,203 but less frequently.
Although the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) publishes monthly data
on airstrikes conducted against Islamic State targets as part of Operation Inherent
Resolve,204 this data is problematic for two reasons. First, the descriptions of targets
are too vague to help determine whether the object or institution was exclusively
military or dual-use in nature. For example, an “ISIL cash distribution center”205 or
“financial facility”206—two ambiguous descriptions that appear frequently in the
official airstrike reports—could both refer to a zakāt office, which is a dual-use
institution by virtue of its simultaneous collection of tax revenue and distribution
of cash transfers and food donations to the poor. But these descriptions could just
as easily refer to a dīwān al-jund (“office of soldiers”), which distributes salaries
and weapons to fighters, administers training camps, and oversees the budgeting of
military operations207—functions that warrant classification as a military objective.
Similarly, “cash storage facilities”208 might refer to zakāt offices, banks, or al-jund
offices—institutions with very different functions that have implications for
targeting decisions under IHL. The second concern with the quality of the
Pentagon’s data is that independent investigations have found that the U.S. military
203
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has failed to disclose thousands of lethal airstrikes conducted over several years in
Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.209 The undercounting of airstrikes and insufficient
granularity of data released by the U.S. military necessitated the collection of new
data for this article.
Data based on local newspapers and social media posts, upon which this
Article relies, may be biased in other ways. For example, anti-American Twitter
users may be motivated to fabricate or exaggerate reports of civilian casualties and
collateral damage resulting from Coalition airstrikes. But when the same report is
corroborated by multiple sources and further supported by photographic evidence,
its credibility increases. To the extent possible, the airstrikes documented in this
article were corroborated with photographic evidence and a second or third
source.210 Another precaution taken to guard against the inclusion of erroneous
reports in the dataset was to count only those airstrikes for which a primary source
(local newspaper or social media post) explicitly identifies the target as a “zakāt”
office using the Arabic word for zakāt, “اﻟﺰﻛﺎة.”
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics of Interview Data
Number
159

Total Interviews
Gender
Age
Interview Location

Contact with IS

Female
Male
<50
>50
Antakya, Turkey
Gaziantep, Turkey
Reyhanlı, Turkey
Şanlıurfa, Turkey
Mosul, Iraq
Erbil, Kurdistan
Dohuk, Kurdistan
Internet/Phone
Lived in or traveled through an IS-controlled
area
Paid taxes to IS
Have a relative, friend, or neighbor who used an
IS court
Have a relative, friend, or neighbor who joined
IS
Provided services to IS members (e.g. medical
care, cooking)
Arrested, imprisoned, or punished by IS
Former IS combatants
Former IS civilian employees
IS fighters or employees (at time of interview)
Civilians who support IS (at time of interview)

45
114
110
49
7
41
5
38
14
28
7
19
159
52
27
41
14
18
24
21
11
8
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Table II. Data on Targeting of Islamic State Zakāt Offices in Iraq and Syria211
Airstrike #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

211

Date
10/8/2014
1/31/2015
3/8/2015
6/25/2015
9/3/2015
10/22/2015
10/29/2015
11/10/2015
11/22/2015
2/13/2016
2/15/2016
3/7/2016
4/16/2016
5/3/2016
5/10/2016
11/3/2016
6/17/2017
8/24/2017
9/29/2017

Country
Iraq
Iraq
Syria
Iraq
Iraq
Syria
Syria
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Syria
Iraq
Iraq
Syria
Syria
Iraq

City or Village
Gogjali
al-Qaim
al-Mayadin
Hit
Mosul
Raqqa
al-Bab
Hawija
al-Jarn
Mosul
Mosul
Mosul
Tel Afar
Raqqa
Rutba
Tel Afar
al-Mayadin
Raqqa
al-Qaim

Conducted By
Unspecified
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition
Syrian government
Unspecified
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition
Unspecified
Unspecified
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition
U.S.-led Coalition

A folder containing the original source files (social media data and local Arabic-language
newspapers) used to assemble the dataset of airstrikes is available at the following link:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/199e6k80nfikk0p/AAD7bfY_8buwgWe0spn2QLuqa?dl=0.

